introduction.tex

\section{Introduction}\label{introduction}

SSH is a security protocols that is widely to interact securely with
remote machines. SSH -- or more precisely, the transport layer
protocol of SSH -- has been subjected to security analysis
\cite{Williams2011Analysis}, incl.\ analyses that revealed
cryptographic shortcomings
\cite{Albrecht2009Plaintext,Bellare2004Breaking,Paterson2010PlaintextDependent}.

But whereas these analyses consider the abstract cryptographic
protocol, this paper looks at actual implementations of SSH, and
investigates flaws in the program logic of these implementations,
rather than cryptographic flaws.  Such logical flaws have occurred in
implementations of other security protocols, notably TLS, with Apple's
'goto fail' bug and the FREAK attack \cite{Beurdouche:2017}.  For this
we use model learning (a.k.a.\ active automata learning)
\cite{Angluin1987Learning,Vaa17} to infer state machines of three SSH
implementations, which we then analyse by model checking for
conformance to both functional and security properties.

The properties we verify for the inferred state machines are based on
the RFCs that specify SSH \cite{rfc4251,rfc4252,rfc4253,rfc4254}.
These properties are formalized in LTL and verified using
NuSMV~\cite{NuSMV2}. Manually verifying these properties would be
difficult, as the learned models are complex.  Moreover, formalizing
properties means we can also better assess and overcome vagueness or
under-specification in the RFC standards.

Model learning obtains a state machine model of a black-box system by
providing inputs and observing outputs.  Since model learning uses a
finite number of observations, we can never be sure that the learned
model is complete\marginpar{\tiny Erik: I prefer 'complete' to
'correct'.} To that end, advanced conformance algorithms are employed
\cite{LeeY96}, which yield some confidence that the system inferred is
in fact complete.  In the context of testing security protocols, model
learning can be seen as a form of fuzzing, where inputs are sent in
unexpected orders to expose any hidden anomalies. 

\paragraph{Related work}

%The SSH protocol has been investigated for cryptographic flaws, e.g.\
%\cite{Williams2011Analysis,Albrecht2009Plaintext,Bellare2004Breaking,Paterson2010PlaintextDependent},
%but that research does not consider logical flaws in actual software
%implementations.

Udrea et al.\cite{Udrea_rule-based_2008} also investigated SSH
implementations for logical flaws.  They used a static analysis tool to
check two C implementations of SSH against an extensive set of rules.
These rules not only express properties of the SSH protocol logic, but
also of message formats and support for earlier versions and various
options. Our analysis only considers the protocol logic.  However,
their rules were tied to routines in the code, so had to be slightly adapted
to fit the different implementations. In contrast, our properties are
defined at an abstract level so do not need such tailoring. Moreover,
our black box approach approach means we can analyse any implemention
of SSH, not just C implementations.  

Formal models of SSH in the form of state machines have been used
before, namely for a manual code review of OpenSSH
\cite{Poll_rigorous_2011}, formal program verification of a Java
implementation of SSH \cite{PollSchubert07}, and for model based
testing of SSH implementations \cite{Boss2012}.  All this research
only considered the SSH transport layer, and not the other SSH
protocol layers.

This paper is borne out of 2 recent theses \cite{Verleg2016,Toon2016}
and is to our knowledge the first combined application of model
learning and model checking in verifying SSH implementations, or more
generally, implementations of any network security protocol.

Model learning has previously been applied to infer state machines of
EMV bank cards~\cite{Aarts2013Formal}, electronic
passports~\cite{Aarts2010Inference}, hand-held readers for online
banking~\cite{Chalupar2014Automated}, and implementations of
TCP~\cite{TCP2016} and TLS~\cite{RuiterProtocol}.  Some of these case
studies relied on manual analysis of the learned models
\cite{Aarts2013Formal,Aarts2010Inference,RuiterProtocol}, but some
also used model checkers \cite{TCP2016,Chalupar2014Automated}.

Instead of using active learning as we do, it is also possible to use
passive learning to obtain protocol state machines
\cite{Wang2011Inferring}.  Here network traffic is observed, and not
actively generated.  This can then also provide a probabilistic
characterisation of normal network traffic, but it cannot uncover
implementation flaws that occur in strange message flows, which is our
goal.

%Our approach, most closely resembles work on TCP~\cite{TCP2016},
%where they also combine classical learning and model checking to
%analyze various TCP implementations, with our work being more focused
%on security properties. Other case studies involving model learning
%rely on  manual analysis of the learned models
%~\cite{Aarts2013Formal,TCP2016,Chalupar2014Automated,RuiterProtocol}.
%Our work differs, since we use a model checker to automatically check
%specifications. Inference of protocols has also been done from
%observing network traffic ~\cite{Wang2011Inferring}. Such inference
%is limited to the traces that occur over a network. Inference is
%further hampered if the analyzed protocols communicate over encrypted
%channels, as this severely limits information available from traces without knowledge of the security key. 

%In this thesis, we will be using protocol state fuzzing to extract an implementations state machine. All fuzzing algorithms rely on the idea of sending unexpected input data to a system under test (SUT) in the hope that this triggers anomalies. Using protocol state fuzzing, however, we will fuzz on the \textit{order} of otherwise correctly-formed messages. 
%This technique has previously been applied to infer state machines of EMV bank cards~\cite{Aarts2013Formal}, electronic passports~\cite{Aarts2010Inference} and hand-held readers for online banking~\cite{Chalupar2014Automated}. Furthermore, implementations of TCP~\cite{Janssen2015Learning} and TLS~\cite{RuiterProtocol} have state-fuzzed. As in these works, we implement state fuzzing
%
%State machines inferred are large and hard to check manually. 
%Once a state machine has been inferred, security-related logical flaws are usually easily spotted by an auditor with some knowledge about the protocol~\cite{RuiterProtocol}. An example of a logical flaw is exchanging user credentials before an encrypted connection has been established. 
%
%Besides security-related logical flaws, inferred state machines can show quirks such as superfluous states. Although these might not be directly exploitable, OpenBSD auditors illustrate why these small bugs should be resolved: ``we are not so much looking for security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if years later someone discovers the problem used to be a security issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the better''\footnote{\url{http://www.openbsd.org/security.html}}.
%
%\textit{Organization.} An outline of the SSH protocol will be provided in Section~\ref{ssh}. The experimental setup is discussed in Section~\ref{setup}. The results are subsequently discussed in Section~\ref{results}, after which we conclude in Section~\ref{conclusions}.
%