10 is the magic number

security_definitions.tex

@@ -32,20 +32,24 @@ This function updates the output and state variables for a given valuation of th
 
 %\lstset{showspaces=true}
 
-\begin{figure}[h]
-\centering
-%\begin{subfigure}
-\begin{tikzpicture}[scale=0.1,>=stealth',shorten >=1pt,auto,node distance=2.5cm]
-  \node[initial,state] (q0)      {$q_0$};
-  \node[state]         (q1) [right of=q0]  {$q_1$};
-
-  \path[->]          (q0)  	edge  						   node {BEGIN/OK} (q1);
-	\path[->]          (q0)  	edge  [loop above]   node {MSG/NOK} (q0);
-	\path[->]          (q1)  	edge  [loop above]   node {BEGIN/OK} (q1);
-  \path[->]          (q1)  	edge  [loop right] 	 node {MSG/ACK} (q1);
-\end{tikzpicture}
-%\end{subfigure}
-\\
+
+\begin{figure}[htbp]
+\begin{tabular}{p{0.17\textwidth}p{0.17\textwidth}}
+    \begin{minipage}{.17\textwidth}
+    \centering
+		\begin{tikzpicture}[scale=0.1,>=stealth',shorten >=1pt,auto,node distance=2.5cm]
+		\footnotesize
+			\node[initial,state] (q0)      {$q_0$};
+			\node[state]         (q1) [below of=q0]  {$q_1$};
+
+			\path[->]          (q0)  	edge  						   node {BEGIN/OK} (q1);
+			\path[->]          (q0)  	edge  [loop above]   node {MSG/NOK} (q0);
+			\path[->]          (q1)  	edge  [loop right]   node {BEGIN/OK} (q1);
+			\path[->]          (q1)  	edge  [loop below] 	 node {MSG/ACK} (q1);
+		\end{tikzpicture}
+    \end{minipage}
+    &
+    \begin{minipage}{.17\textwidth}
 \tiny
 \begin{lstlisting}
 	MODULE main 
@@ -67,12 +71,12 @@ This function updates the output and state variables for a given valuation of th
 			state = q1 & inp = MSG: ACK;
 		esac;
 \end{lstlisting}
-
-\caption{Mealy machine + associated NuSMV code}
-\label{fig:nusmvex}
+\end{minipage}
+\end{tabular}
+		\caption{Mealy machine + associated NuSMV code}
+		\label{fig:nusmvex}
 \end{figure}
 
-
 The remainder of this section defines the properties we formalized and verified. We group these properties into four categories: 
 
 \begin{enumerate}
@@ -242,8 +246,7 @@ The RFC states in~\cite[p. 24]{rfc4254} that after sending a \textsc{kexinit} me
 \begin{property}
 \begin{lstlisting}[basicstyle=\footnotesize]
 	G ( out=KEXINIT -> 
-		X ( (out!=SR_ACCEPT & out!=KEXINIT) 
-			W receivedNewKeys )	)
+X ( (out!=SR_ACCEPT & out!=KEXINIT) W receivedNewKeys) )
 \end{lstlisting}
 %\caption{Disallowed outputs after KEXINIT}
 %\captionsetup{font=small}
@@ -333,7 +336,7 @@ In particular, we used {\dvauth} instead of $out=UA\_SUCCESS$ to suggest success
 	\small
 	\begin{tabular}{| l | l | c | c |c | c |}
 		\hline 
-		          &   					 																	&		          & 		\multicolumn{3}{c|}{\emph{SSH Implementation}}\\ \cline{4-6} 					
+		 %         &   					 																	&		          & 		\multicolumn{3}{c|}{\emph{SSH Implementation}}\\ \cline{4-6} 					
 							&   Property 	 																	&	Key word &\tiny{OpenSSH}	                 		& \tiny{Bitvise}              & \tiny{DropBear} \\ \hline 
 		Security  &   Trans. 		 																	&		          & \dt  		                 		& \dt                  & \dt                					  \\ \cline{3-6} 
 		    			&   Auth.      																	&		          & \dt	 		                 		& \dt                  & \dt                					  \\ \hline 
@@ -361,6 +364,6 @@ does leave room for interpretation of the \textsc{unimpl} message.
 DropBear is the only implementation that allows rekey in both general states of the protocol. DropBear also satisfies all transport layer specifications, however,
 problematically, it violates properties of the higher layers. Upon receiving \text{ch\_close}, it responds by \textsc{ch\_eof} instead of \text{ch\_close}, not respecting 
 Property~\ref{prop:conn-close}. Moreover, the output \textsc{ua\_success} can be generated multiple times, violating both Properties ~\ref{prop:auth-post-ua-strong} and
-(implicitly)  ~\ref{prop:auth-post-ua}.
+ ~\ref{prop:auth-post-ua}.
 
 %, though key exchange is strangely not universally permitted, while some of the functional properties described are not met.